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Abstract— The emergence of mobile applications to execute 
sensitive operations has brought a myriad of security threats to 
both enterprises and users. In order to benefit from the large 
potential in smartphones there is a need to manage the risks 
arising from threats, while maintaining an easy interface for the 
users. In this paper we investigate the use of Trusted Platform 
Model (TPM) 2.0 to develop a secure application for 
smartphones using Windows Phone 8.1. In particular, we suggest 
a framework based on remote attestation as a proxy to 
authenticate remote services, where the device is associated to the 
user and replaces the user’s credentials. In addition, we use the 
TPM 2.0 to enable secured information and data storage within 
the device itself. We present an implementation and performance 
evaluation of the suggested architecture that uses our novel 
attestation and authentication scheme and reveal the caveats of 
using software TPM in today’s mobile devices. 
Keywords— Security, Trusted Computing, Application Security 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Smartphones are being increasingly used to perform 
sensitive operations such as mobile banking transactions, 
storing sensitive data, and as a payment method. For 
applications to securely perform operations they have to rely 
mainly on the security provided by the operating system and 
third-party cryptographic libraries in order to design secure 
applications. The aforementioned give no choice to developers 
but to use and trust respectively the features offered by the OS 
provider and external security libraries provided by 
individuals. The latter leaves many developers limited in 
functionality to design an application that is secure and 
usable[1],[2], [3].  
In order to secure operations, assure the integrity of the 
application, platform, and the software running on the device, 
trusted computing approaches have been adopted[2]–[6]. In 
many pieces of research, desktops and servers systems’ were 
developed to assure the integrity and confidentiality of the 
code/data within an application. These systems use hardware 
elements, Trusted Platform Module (TPM) and Intel’s Trusted 
Execution Technology (TXT).  
Most of the proposed solutions are feasible on desktops and 
servers but not on mobile platforms and that’s due to the 
absence of Intel TXT, Hardware TPM chip in such platforms. 
Alternatively, ARM based chips are being used in mobile 
platforms such as Nokia Lumia 830[7] and others. In which, 
ARM provides Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) called 
ARM TrustZone[8] that provides hardware memory protection 
for the trusted environment. The latter allows running smaller 
Trusted Computing Base (TCB) in an environment that is 
isolated from the rest of the execution. 
 In smartphones, several pieces of research used emulated 
TPM. However, these approaches used a software TPM either 
in the kernel level[9] or as an embedded library[10], but not in 
a trustworthy environment that is separated from other code in 
the system. Starting from Windows Phone 8.1, all Windows 
Phone devices include software TPM. The TPM provided by 
Microsoft, runs in trustworthy hardware, ARM TrustZone. In 
which, the TrustZone secures the execution of the TPM and 
separates such a sensitive component from the applications 
and most of the system.  
Our contributions in this paper are: 
1. We investigate the usage of TPM 2.0, and the ability of 
such component to enable useable security in mobile 
devices.  
2. We present a prototype implementation of mobile 
banking application that uses TPM 2.0 and provide 
evaluation results for our proof of concept.  
3. We present performance evaluation of a well-known 
TPM 2.0 functions that run in a mobile platform, 
Nokia Lumia 830. 
4. We explain what is still missing, and what are the 
caveats in using software TPM in today’s devices. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follow. Section 2 
describes related work on trusted computing in mobile 
devices.  Section 3 explains features of trusted computing 
which are relevant to our work.  In section 4 we propose a new 
framework for trusted mobile applications, making use of 
remote attestation.  Section 5 describes a proof-of-concept 
implementation, and presents benchmarks for its operation.  
Section 6 evaluates the app framework using the TPM. The 
paper ends with an outline of what is missing when using 
software TPM, and some conclusions. 
 
II. RELATED WORK 
The notion of using TPM for mobile phones is not new. 
However, there is no TPM chip available in mobile platforms. 
Several pieces of research adopted the TPM to preserve 
privacy and provide trust in the system.  
Some approaches [9][11][12] used mini TPM emulator as a 
Linux Kernel Module (LKM) and is part of the android kernel. 
In [11], Nauman and colleges present an attestation 
mechanism for VM-based architecture OS, Android, and show 
the feasibility in terms of complexity and battery 
consumption. 
In subsequent work by the same group [9], a protocol for 
keystroke dynamics analysis is proposed, in which it enables 
web-based applications to make use of remote attestation in 
android platform.  
 
However, these approaches relay on an emulated TPM that is 
part of the android kernel, thus, the trustworthiness of this 
element is questionable. Such an approach does not get the 
benefits of a TPM being a secure element, which is protected 
from the OS and other code. Also, there is nothing mentioned 
about the execution environment and the TCB of the same 
environment. The TPM is good candidate that provides much 
functionality for securing a system. However, once 
compromised there is no guarantee that it can still assure the 
confidentiality of the data or the integrity of the system.  
 
Other papers[13], [10], [14] extended the OS kernel to assure 
that a trusted code runs before the rest of the application, thus 
enables to verify the integrity before passing execution to 
applications in the same system. GuarDroid [10], provides a 
trusted path between the user and the app server by leveraging 
a service  added to the OS. The user inserts his password to a 
trusted input provided by the OS, which in turn encrypted with 
a protected secret key. The point is to hide passwords from 
untrusted apps while preserving external behaviour. In [14], 
Zhang el al. develop a system to ensure that a secure kernel is 
booted. Once the kernel is booted, the work is done by the 
measured software to ensure a well-behaved execution of the 
system through an agent that enforces authenticated security 
policies.  
These approaches assume trusted OS or other measured 
software that run in the same environment as the OS. The user 
is not protected from vulnerabilities in the code. Once the OS 
is compromised there is no assurance that the confidentiality 
of the data is kept.  
Our approach is different in that it uses a TPM stand-alone 
from the rest of the system. We promote the use of a stand-
alone element, the TPM, that is not an extension of the OS. 
We develop an application that makes use of software TPM 
that runs in a secure environment, ARM TrustZone. We show 
how a TPM can elevate security that is also usable in mobile 
platform. 
 
III. BACKGROUND 
A. Trusted computing 
Trusted computing, presented by the Trusted Computing 
Group (TCG), introduced a unique security mechanism 
through hardware. The TPM from the family 2.0 [15] can be 
integrated into many different platforms including mobile 
devices and PCs. The TPM, a cryptographic co-processor, is 
designed to be resilient to software attacks and to possess 
unique security features for protecting secrets, randomness, 
sequencing, protected storage, and reporting [16]. It provides 
security functions like random number generator (RNG), 
Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs) that identify the 
platform, key generation, and various cryptographic functions.  
The TPM keeps track of the platform’s state using the PCRs. 
The PCRs are divided into two parts; the static PCRs and the 
dynamic PCRs. The static registers take their initial value on 
TPM reset only (designed to coincide with platform reset) and 
are used for the evaluation during the boot stages to prevent 
access to secrets if the extended PCRs do not match the 
required data. They enable a chain of trust for the booting 
process.  
The TCG introduced the concept of Locality that allows 
various trusted processes on the platform to communicate with 
the TPM such that the TPM is aware of which trusted process 
is sending commands. The second generation of TPM (TPM 
2.0) includes a range of localities [17] to enable flexibility 
when using the dynamic PCRs. In particular, the TCG Mobile 
Phone Working Group (MPWG)  introduces two new 
localities (32 and 33) that are related to a Trusted Execution 
Environment (TEE) [17]; locality 32 which indicates access 
from the code within the same TEE as the receiving TPM 
Mobile, and locality 33 which indicates access from an 
application TPM Mobile residing in the same TEE as a 
platform TPM mobile. The dynamic PCRs can be reset during 
run time in TPM2.0 using the TPM2_PCR_RESET when 
having the right permissions, giving more flexibility for the 
OS and the applications in managing the PCRs’ values[15]. 
The authorisation level of the mobile applications and the 
operating system is determined according to the localities, 
where the operating system runs with locality value 2 and acts 
as the Measured Launched Environment (MLE) that manages 
the PCRs values. The application can use localities’ values 32 
and 34 in TEE as mentioned earlier, and the operating system 
acts as the dynamic Root of Trust for Measurements (RTM) 
and provides dynamic chain of trust during run time that starts 
from the MLE.  The TPM can associate a certain data to a 
platform’s state and identity using the sealing process. The 
TPM ensures association of the data to a platform by adding a 
nonce to the data package that associates the data package to 
an individual TPM. The record of the nonce is kept inside the 
TPM, and during the unsealing process the TPM validates the 
correctness of the nonce in the data package[16]. The PCRs 
are checked only during the unsealing process and only 
correct pre-selected values will lead to success of the 
operation.  
B. Remote attestation 
Remote attestation is a feature of the TPM intended to enable 
the affirmation of remote services. It reports PCR values using 
Attestation Identity keys (AIKs), allowing remote services to 
validate the content of the signature and the PCR values – a 
representation of some part of the platform state. The reported 
signature and PCRs are validated against a white list at the 
remote service, which is obtained on first registration to a 
service. The remote service uses the public part of the key to 
validate the AIK to the AIK credential. Through attestation, a 
platform can verify that only trusted software is executing, by 
verifying root of trust of the measured parts in the chain that 
lead to the executing software.  
C. Windows Phone 8.1 Security 
Windows Phone uses two latest standards-based security 
hardware components[18], UEFI and TPM, to keep the 
confidentiality of the data and the integrity of the platform and 
its software.  UEFI ensures that the OS loader is secure, 
tamper free, or modified by an attacked. In addition, UEFI 
initializes the hardware and runs integrity checks that verify 
the integrity of the firmware before passing the executions. 
Such ability protects the firmware from rootkits and enables 
the transition from hardware to software after verifying its 
trustworthiness. The aforementioned enables booting the 
system securely and prevents attackers from jail breaking the 
device and installing uncertified apps.  
UEFI and the OS use TPM to store integrity measurement, 
which verify that the measured software hasn’t changed. 
Extending the hashes of the software using the TPM during 
the boot process brings the device to a trusted state, and any 
change in the software is reflected on the TPM which in turn 
refuses of decrypting and unsealing sensitive data within the 
device. 
 
IV. FRAMEWORK FOR TRUSTED MOBILE APPLICATION 
In this framework we use trusted computing technology, the 
TPM to secure sensitive data such as banking information. 
The Local Mobile Application (LMA) uses the TPM to store 
the identity and the credentials used for user authentication to 
the remote server. The local mobile application authenticates 
the user’s identity in each access using a PIN or a fingerprint. 
The PIN is an important component for using the LMA; as it 
is used to access the application, in addition to being used as a 
configuration parameter for local TPM operations. The LMA 
establishes a trusted channel connection to the remote 
application server, and it undertakes mutual authentication 
with the bank server. 
To focus on the strength of using TPM in a smartphone, we 
assume that the operating system is not compromised and each 
application runs in an isolated execution environment. In 
addition, we assume that a trusted code manages the dynamic 
PCRs when moving between applications by storing the PCRs 
value when another application is running and retrieves them 
when needed. We argue that these assumptions are reasonable 
in the context of mobile. Our framework consists of two parts, 
the registration process and the login process which both use 
a trusted channel to communicate between the device and the 
bank service. The channel carries all requests and responses 
between the user’s device and the bank server through the 
secure TLS protocol connection to protect the exchanged data 
and authenticate the bank server. The bank maintains a white 
list of the acceptable entries which is obtained during the 
initial registration to the bank service: each entry is tied to a 
user’s data and used by the bank for user authentication. The 
registration and login processes are explained in more detail in 
the following sections.   
 
We use a sequence of authentication and attestation processes 
between the user, mobile application, and the bank service. 
The user authenticates to the mobile application and only then 
the app establishes a SSL/TLS session that authenticates the 
bank service, which then authenticates the user in two steps, 
and attests the mobile application. In the first authentication 
process, the activation key plays a major role in authenticating 
and associating the user with the app since the activation key 
is unique per user. This is important because only a certified 
app with appropriate activation key can authenticate to the 
bank service, thus, protecting the users against phishing 
attacks. In the second step, the app provides the user’s 
credentials which are sent to the bank service to get access to 
the user’s account. Both steps are essential in the initialisation 
process because the activation key is not associated to any 
user, and the credentials associate the activation key to a user.  
A. Mobile application registration 
Fig. 1 describes the process of registering a new account with 
the mobile application. Applications can be downloaded from 
the App store of the platform provider: only signed and 
certified applications that have a unique license should be 
used. The license validity is verified by the OS before 
installing any app on the device. When starting the application 
the OS measures the software and extends the measurement 
into a dynamic PCR. We assume that the operating system 
uses application-specific PCRs and manages them according 
to the running application thus allowing us to use the dynamic 
PCR without worrying that other application will overwrite it. 
This gives control to the bank service, enabling it to revoke a 
configuration from its white list when a version is out of date 
or contains security holes. This method enables the bank to 
protect its users when discovering security vulnerability in the 
application they provide.  
Upon first time start, an activation key is needed to unlock the 
app: this is provided to the user by the bank. It is used to 
associate an application to the user and allows stronger 
authentication with every access. The activation key is hashed 
and extended into the dynamic PCRs, and stored safely using 
a storage key (SK) created by the TPM. 
Using the TPM to verify the user’s identity mitigates software 
attacks, while keeping the integrity and confidentiality of the 
user. Using a dedicated key, fingerprint or password (e.g. 
PIN), the user’s identity is proved to the application at every 
use. This key is hashed by the TPM and secured using a SK 
which associates the user’s key to the platform.  The 
application verifies the authenticity of the user’s key with 
every start/resume of the application.  
The local mobile application (LMA) establishes a trusted 
channel with the remote application using TLS to enable 
secure communication between the mobile and the bank 
server. The application requests the account details in order to 
access it from the remote application, which in turn 
authenticates the user’s details and creates an access certificate 
for future access. The application stores these results in the 
TPM once and uses them as OpenID to get the data for the 
requesting service when working with two step authentication. 
A blob with the user’s credentials, associated to the relevant 
dynamic PCRs is created and stored in the device. The 
dynamic PCR state is signed using an AIK and sent to the 
bank for user attestation with every connection. 
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Fig. 1. User Registeration Flow 
 
B. Secure mobile login 
Fig. 2 describes the sequence of events in using the app after 
completing the registration process. In order to establish a 
connection with the bank, it is important to attest and 
authenticate the mobile application and the user’s data stored 
within it against the bank’s records. The OS measures the 
application and extends the value into the dynamic PCR, 
which then passes the control to the banking application. The 
app requests a PIN for user authentication, and it uses the 
TPM to hash the PIN before extending it to the dynamic 
PCRs. In order to communicate with the bank server, the 
device needs to attest and authenticate its identity. The app 
extracts the user’s data through TPM unseal operation on the 
stored blob; the success of the operation requires the right 
values of the dynamic PCRs. The three conditions that need to 
be met for successful unsealing operation are right (1) values 
for the activation key, (2) hashed software, and (3) user PIN.  
These PCR values reflect the state of the device; they are 
signed using AIK and sent to the bank server to complete the 
client’s attestation and authentication between the bank and 
the user’s device, for establishing a trusted channel. The bank 
authenticates the user’s device PCR values against a list of 
known “good values”[19]. On completion of the attestation 
process, the user’s credentials are sent automatically by the 
mobile device to the bank server for authentication. The bank 
verifies the user’s data and grants access to the user. The 
user’s credentials are used for first time accessing the bank 
services and on later access the two-step authentication 
provides two independent pieces of authenticity.  
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Fig. 2. User Login Flow 
V. PROOF OF CONCEPT 
In this section we describe the implementation of the 
application’s architecture described in the previous sections. 
The objective of this implementation is to demonstrate that 
using current technologies, it is realisable to achieve the 
security standards we specified. 
A. Implementation Specifications  
We implement an application for Windows Phone 8.1. 
Windows Phone 8.1 based architecture is Windows NT kernel, 
the same kernel used for Windows 8. “.Net” can be used for 
developing applications for both operating systems and the 
implementation used for developing an app in one 
environment, can be suitable for the other environment. We 
designed the application for Windows Phone 8.1. We use C# 
to develop an elementary application that uses the software 
TPM in a smartphone. The application communicates with 
TPM2.0 through Windows TBS (TPM Base Services) system 
call in C#.  In order to use the TPM we use TBS function that 
receives “TPM command” in binary format as an input to the 
TPM. 
In our implementation we couldn’t use the TSS.Net 
library[20] since it is not compatible with Windows phone 
environment. Notwithstanding, in the near future these 
libraries should be able to support Windows phone 
environment since the base code, as introduced by the TCG 
specification  for communicating with the TPM, is in C.  
Our system consists of two devices and a channel to 
communicate between them. The first runs the bank 
application (the client) and the second runs the bank services. 
The communication channel between the two ends uses SSL 
protocol for communication, and we use the SSL library 
developed by Microsoft to make use of this protocol. 
B. TSS.Net 
The TSS.Net library is a managed code written in C#. The 
library is open source and is used for easy access to the TPM. 
It makes it easier writing Windows application using the TPM. 
The TSS.Net handles all the low level functionality when 
using the TPM, hiding all the complex interactions from the 
developer. In addition, the library communicates with the 
TPM simulator through a network socket TCP/IP to give the 
opportunity of development and debugging.  
C. TPM2.0  
The TPM2.0 simulator was developed by Microsoft and the 
TCG based on the TPM 2.0 specification [15]. It emulates the 
TPM 2.0 commands in software. To our knowledge there is no 
hardware TPM aligned to TPM 2.0 specification. We use the 
TPM 2.0 simulator as a tool to test our framework. Microsoft 
surface [21], and Nokia Lumia 830 include a TPM 2.0 
simulator running in the TEE of Arm TrustZone[8] processor 
to protect its secrets.  
VI. EVALUATION 
The goal of our design is to provide a framework for mobile 
applications which is easy to use and at the same time does not 
compromise security. In order for users to access their 
accounts, they are required only to authenticate themselves to 
the mobile application by providing a PIN of their choice. The 
initialisation process requires more efforts from the user by 
requesting all the relevant data such as activation code of the 
application, gating PIN to the application, and user credentials 
to access the bank services. This information is initially 
obtained from the bank.  However, it is performed for one 
instance only during the setup time and the user is exempt 
from providing these data with every future access to the bank 
account.  
In order to provide a secure end-to-end solution we 
recommend trusted computing technology, the TPM to protect 
the integrity and confidentiality of the user’s data, SSL for 
secure channel connection, and two level authentications. The 
first level authentication in the login process can be done with 
the attestation data only, this association between the 
authentication and attestation in the setup process enables the 
user to replace bank credentials with attestation data for access 
control to the bank services. The use of these security 
elements are hidden from the user making it easier to use, and 
at the same time provides secure connection to the bank 
services. 
 
A. System benchmarks  
The proof of concept implementation was tested on a Nokia 
Lumia 830[7] with an Arm Quad-Core Cortex-A7 CPU 
running at a clock frequency of 1.2 GHz and TPM2 simulator 
(version 1.0) running in the secure world of Arm TrustZone. 
Using our implementation we are able to evaluate the time 
scale and relative time costs for the different operation 
performed. 
Table 1 shows the time measurements of the operation 
performed on a “software TPM 2.0” that runs in the secure 
zone of ARM TrustZone processor. In order to test the 
performance of these operations in Nokia Lumia 830, we 
executed each operation 10000 and assume equal probability 
for each measurement to calculate the Standard Deviation (Std 
Dev).  
Table 3 shows the differences between a credential-approach 
compared to the several stages we suggested in our 
framework. We determined the credentials’ size based on the 
banking application. Our initialisation process uses more data 
compared to the credentials approach. However, in steady 
state we use less data when working with one step 
authentication and more data when working with two steps. 
The two step authentication adds another level of security 
where the bank checks the user credentials with every access 
by the user, where the one step uses the remote attestation and 
application Activation Key only. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 summaries the number of operations used in the 
registration and the log-in processes respectively. In the login 
process, one unsealing operation could be spared when giving 
up the second authentication stage. 
Table 5 summarises the points addressed in this paper 
compared to existing technology. We mention how current 
technology addresses each point, the flaws that exist in current 
technology, and how does our framework overcome them. 
 
Table 5. Mobile Application summary compared to current 
technology 
Points Current 
solution 
Vulnerability/issues Our solution 
Brute force 
attack 
External 
device 
password 
generator 
 
Requires 
additional device 
TPM anti-
hammering 
mechanism 
Man in the 
middle 
SSL/TLS Certificates 
managing and 
handling 
Dual 
authentication 
and remote 
attestation 
 
VII. WHAT IS MISSING? 
In modern mobile operating systems e.g. Android, iOS, and 
Windows Phone, the OS enforces permission based access 
control to secure an element such as a file, a resource, and a 
service. This approach is proving to be inefficient as the 
number of vulnerabilities in OS is rising. 
 
The use of software TPM allows the use of standards-based 
security that is also flexible to adapt in several systems such as 
smartphones and cloud environment. However, it is important 
to take into consideration the attack vector that rises in a 
system from adopting such an approach. The approach in 
smartphones for using software TPM is running such sensitive 
element in a secure environment that is isolated from the 
applications, Arm TrustZone. This environment is referred to 
as the secure world, and it’s protected from applications that 
run in the non-secure world. However, the software TPM is 
not the only code executing in the secure world and there are 
others such as part of the OS and the kernel that run in such 
environment. Hence, the TPM is not protected from 
vulnerabilities in the rest of the code that has access to the 
secure world, e.g. the kernel. In the aforementioned approach, 
the TPM is a stand-alone element from the OS and the kernel, 
and runs in a trusted secure environment. However, it cannot 
be considered as a secure element as a hardware TPM. 
A. Secure Element 
While the integrity of the software can be checked through 
verifying the hashed value at boot time, it does not guarantee 
the integrity of the code during run-time. A change in the 
execution can be easily achieved if other software has access 
to the executing environment. To counter this shortcoming, 
isolating an element from the rest of the system can provide a 
smaller TCB that is limited to the code of the desired element.  
A secure element (SE) is a combination of hardware and 
software and it provides us with secure environment of 
execution that is protected from the rest of the system. 
Nowadays, many mobile devices possess ARM processors 
that provide TEE. The TEE by itself does not provide the 
capability to create a SE since the TCB is not limited to 
software TPM but also to part of the OS.  
B. Trusted Path 
Trust path refers to assuring that the user’s input gets to the 
desired destination only and is protected from an untrusted 
app or the OS.  The TPM can protect against brute force attack 
of passwords/PINs using anti-hammering, according to which, 
the TPM locks itself after configurable number of wrong 
attempts. This prevents the attacker from guessing the 
password in a reasonable time. However, passwords can be 
sniffed by untrusted application and the OS. This can be used 
by an untrusted app to access sensitive information and 
authenticate itself to the TPM and perform any operation like 
a valid user.  
Table 1. Time of execution measurements.  
Operation Time (ms) [Std Dev] 
RNG 0.896 [0.17] 
PCR Read 1.05 [0.12] 
Sha1 Data Hash 1.06 [0.15] 
Sha1 Key Sign 0.4 [0.07] 
Extend PCR  1.2 [0.11] 
 
Table 3. Number of bytes used in 
the two approaches 
 
 Bytes 
Credential based 44 
Registration process 84 
Login (1 Step) 40 
Login (2 Steps) 84 
 
 
 
Table 4. The Number of operations in the Registeration and 
login process 
Operation Number of 
calls  
(Login 
process) 
Number of calls 
(Registration process) 
Sealing  0 2 
Hashing  1 1 
Unsealing 1-2 0 
AIK Generation 1 1 
Extend PCR 3 3 
 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
Mobile applications have gained popularity with the 
advancement of mobile technologies. Many approaches have 
been suggested to solve security issues that arise when using 
mobile devices. Many papers addressing security in mobile 
applications rely on old technologies and suggest solutions 
within their limitations. However, many of these methods [22] 
are point solutions and are not easy to use, which present a 
serious limitation since the user becomes discouraged by the 
many layers of security measures.  
Many methods aim to enhance security of mobile applications, 
by requiring more user input like copying codes from a smart 
card or SMS message, putting more responsibility on the users 
to enhance security. These methods became impractical and 
inconvenient to use, and having simple access control while 
not compromising security becomes essential. The use of a 
PIN is an easy access control for mobile application and hides 
all the security levels from the user making it very convenient 
and simple to use. 
In this paper we show how using TPM 2.0 mitigate some of 
the existing threats on mobile applications using Trusted 
Computing Technology, the TPM, to improve current security 
schemes for mobile applications (Table 5). We propose a 
novel communication protocol that uses both authentication 
and attestation for setting up the user’s account, hence 
removing the pressure of securing the credential by the user 
alone.  In addition, we point to the missing pieces in using this 
technology. Our prototype implementation demonstrates 
feasibility and a path to an implementation on a mobile 
platform with the necessary trust characteristics. 
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